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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
With the consent of all parties, amicus curiae Recording Industry 
Association of America, Inc. (“RIAA”) respectfully submits this brief urging 
reversal of the district court rulings addressed herein.1 
The RIAA is the trade organization that supports and promotes the 
creative and financial vitality of the major recorded music companies.  Its 
members are the music labels that comprise the most vibrant record 
industry in the world.  RIAA members create, manufacture, and/or 
distribute approximately 85% of all legitimate recorded music produced and 
sold in the United States. 
The RIAA’s members create and make available to the American 
public a vast number and variety of copyrighted sound recordings.  The 
business of the defendants-appellees (“defendants”) is built on unlawfully 
exploiting the works of RIAA members and others, by engaging in and 
facilitating for profit the unauthorized copying and distribution of these 
works on a massive scale.  The RIAA’s members are harmed by the type of 
                                                            
1 Counsel for the parties have not authored this brief in whole or in part.  No 
one other than amicus and its members contributed money that was 
intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. 
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large-scale Internet piracy at issue in this case, which the district court in the 
decisions under review erroneously held did not constitute copyright 
infringement.  The RIAA and its members therefore have a significant 
interest in the important questions that this case presents concerning the 
liability of Internet businesses that illicitly profit from the copying and 
distribution of pirated works.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court believed that the rulings now under review “helped 
demarcate the boundaries of copyright law.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, 
Inc., 2015 WL 1746484, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (Birotte, J.) (quotation 
omitted).  On a number of important issues regarding liability for direct and 
secondary copyright infringement, the district court indeed staked out new 
law in a sense – by disregarding and misapplying existing law, including 
controlling Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.  In doing so, the 
district court provided legal immunity to a business that profits from mass 
piracy by selling access to unauthorized copies of copyrighted works that it 
chooses to copy, store, and make available on its servers.  This is the very 
same type of business that the Southern District of New York in an earlier 
case held liable for direct, contributory, and vicarious infringement, and 
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intentional inducement of infringement.  See Arista Records LLC v. 
Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Arista II”).  The 
district court’s analysis of important copyright law questions was wrong in at 
least the following ways: 
1. The district court erred in holding that concerns for protecting 
the operation of the open Internet that animated early decisions involving 
Usenet, like Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(“Netcom”), also protect defendants’ starkly different private, fee-based 
business that actively promotes piracy.  Defendants program their servers to 
reproduce massive quantities of unauthorized copies of copyrighted music, 
movies, software, and images, which they take from other servers known to 
host pirated content.  Defendants then distribute those infringing copies to 
users for the specific purpose of profiting from copyright infringement, 
charging a fee that increases based on how much content each user wants to 
download, up to $35 a month. 
To accomplish their aims, defendants utilize the Usenet network, a 
network of interconnected servers that predates the World Wide Web.  But 
defendants’ conduct does not resemble in any relevant way the conduct of the 
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Usenet service providers in 1990s cases that involved facilitation of access to 
comments on Internet bulletin boards. 
2. In rulings entered on motions to dismiss, Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Giganews, Inc., 2013 WL 2109963, at *5-9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (Matz, J.); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 2013 WL 3610706, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 
2013) (Collins, J.), and at summary judgment, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, 
Inc., 2014 WL 8628034, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) (Birotte, J.), the 
district court misstated and misapplied the law of direct infringement in 
three important and related respects. 
First, addressing an open question in this Circuit, the district court 
endorsed the controversial “volitional conduct” requirement for direct 
infringement.  While such a test has been articulated by courts including 
panels of the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals, it has been 
widely criticized and questioned by other courts and commentators, including 
district courts in this Circuit.  In addition, the Supreme Court declined to 
adopt a volitional conduct requirement for direct infringement only a year 
ago in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2507 
(2014).  This Court should do the same. 
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Second, the district court rejected defendants’ liability for direct 
infringement on the ground that defendants had automated their 
infringement, based on the court’s erroneous belief that the volitional 
conduct test requires such a result.  It is not and has never been the law that 
a defendant that uses software that causes unauthorized copies to be made is 
any less liable for direct infringement than a defendant that does the same 
thing manually. 
Third, even if one accepted arguendo the contention that a volitional 
conduct requirement existed for direct infringement of the reproduction 
right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), no such requirement could exist for infringement of 
the distribution right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).  The distribution right covers 
conduct – such as making works available for distribution by sale, rental, or 
lending, see id. – that inherently requires no “volitional” act by a distributing 
defendant. 
3. The district court misstated the test for intentional inducement 
of copyright infringement by confusing it with the test for contributory 
infringement by material contribution.  A defendant is liable for intentional 
inducement when it (1) provides a device, product, or service; (2) with the 
object or intent of promoting its use to infringe copyright; and (3) the device, 
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product, or service causes (4) acts of infringement by another.  See Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1032, 1033 (9th Cir. 2013).  The 
Supreme Court and this Court have both made clear that actual knowledge 
of specific infringements caused by a defendant’s inducement is not an 
element of the intentional inducement test.  See MGM Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931, 934 (2005); Fung, 710 F.3d at 1037-38.  
Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants 
on the sole basis that “there is no evidence that Giganews had any actual 
knowledge of any specific infringing materials that it did not immediately 
block access to.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 2014 WL 8628031, at *11 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014) (Birotte, J.).  This was clear legal error. 
4. The district court also misapplied the law governing the 
knowledge element of contributory infringement by material contribution.  
Defendants’ summary judgment motion did not raise a Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512, safe harbor defense.  The 
district court nevertheless invoked a facially inapplicable DMCA safe harbor 
provision, id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i), to reject key evidence of defendants’ actual 
knowledge of specific infringement, see Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *8-9.  
This too was clear legal error.  
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5. Finally, the district court misstated the law of vicarious 
infringement liability.  A defendant infringes vicariously by (1) receiving a 
financial benefit from others’ direct infringement while (2) declining to 
exercise a right or ability to stop or limit the infringement.  See Grokster, 545 
U.S. at 930.  A plaintiff can satisfy the financial benefit element by showing 
that “the availability of infringing material acts as a draw for customers.”  
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(quotation omitted). 
Citing no legal authority, the district court added an extra element to 
the vicarious liability test.  The court held that a plaintiff also must prove 
that its own works, or its category of works, acted as a specific draw to 
defendants’ service.  See Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *3-4.  This ruling is 
contrary to decades of vicarious infringement jurisprudence, which rests 
defendants’ liability on their profiting from general infringing activity that 
they have the ability to supervise or control.  Affirming such a ruling would 
upend the policy behind vicarious liability, shielding companies able to 
supervise or control infringement on their service when the infringing 
activity from which they profit is so extensive that it makes the infringement 
of the works of smaller plaintiffs difficult to measure. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Case Law from the 1990s Discussing the Usenet Network Should 
Not Immunize Defendants’ Different and Modern Piracy Service  
The district court relied on factually outdated case law concerning the 
Usenet network of the 1990s to reach the erroneous conclusion that a finding 
of direct liability in this case could threaten “‘countless parties whose role in 
the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that 
is necessary for the functioning of the Internet.’”  Giganews, 2014 WL 
8628034, at *7 (quoting Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372). 
The Usenet network described in 1990s case law was generally free to 
use for those with an Internet connection.  For instance, none of the 
defendants in Netcom charged a fee for access to servers connected to the 
Usenet network.  See 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.  “Usenet was originally 
created to distribute text content only,” Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, 
Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Arista I”), and the early 
Usenet cases concerned dissemination of written works such as “exchange[s] 
of information [and] opinion on . . .topic[s] running the gamut from . . . the 
music of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to the Chicago 
Bulls,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
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It was these service providers – who directly and indirectly supported 
this open Usenet – to which the Netcom court referred when it expressed 
concern about protecting “countless parties whose role in the infringement is 
nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is necessary for 
the functioning of the Internet.”  Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372. 
The conduct at issue today is entirely different.  Shady companies now 
use the Usenet network to copy copyrighted movies, music, software, and 
images from servers known to host pirated content; store those works on 
their own servers for extended periods of time to maximize the availability of 
the infringing content; and then distribute those pirated copies to their users.  
See, e.g., Paul Craig, Software Piracy Exposed 157 (2005). 
These companies profit handsomely by charging their users monthly 
fees for private access to this unauthorized content – fees that increase based 
on the amount of content users download.  See Arista II, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 
131 (defendants, charging from $4.95 to $18.95 a month for access to the 
pirated content on their servers). 
The “newsgroups” that are copied from server to server include those 
that are devoted to distributing pirated works, with names such as 
“alt.binaries.sounds.mp3.beachboys” and “alt.binaries.music.springsteen,” 
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and the “articles” include files that contain pirated works.  Arista I, 608 F. 
Supp. 2d at 428.  In Arista II, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, ruling 
against defendants that, like the defendants here, ran a piracy business that 
operated on the Usenet network.  See 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.  Notably, a 
study conducted in that case actually sampled the content of music files from 
pirate newsgroups available on the servers of one of the two defendants here, 
Giganews.2  The study concluded that more than 94% of the music files 
available from Giganews were either unauthorized or highly likely to have 
been unauthorized.  See Arista II, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 144.  
This case simply involves defendants who utilize the Usenet to profit 
from piracy by selling access to infringing content from private servers that 
they control.  Unlike legitimate service providers involved in the early 
Usenet cases, the defendants here are committing blatant copyright 
infringement.  Recognizing this fact does not undermine in any way the 
operation of the open Internet. 
                                                            
2 After being sued, the defendants in Arista II destroyed evidence of 
newsgroups hosted on their own servers.  As a substitute, plaintiffs’ expert 
studied similar newsgroups available on the servers of Giganews.  Arista II, 
633 F. Supp. 2d at 144. 
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II. The District Court Misstated the Test for Direct Copyright 
Infringement 
In Arista II, the court found the defendants to have engaged in direct 
copyright infringement through their comprehensive control over the 
copying, storage, and distribution of unauthorized content on their own 
computer servers as part of their for-pay Usenet service.  See 633 F. Supp. 
2d at 148-49.   
The Arista II defendants engaged in direct copyright infringement in 
several ways.  They programmed their servers to copy from newsgroups 
devoted to supplying pirated mp3 music files that were popular with 
defendants’ users; they created servers optimized for storing and 
distributing such files; and they controlled the content copied by and 
available on their servers – activities that “transform[ed] Defendants from 
passive providers of a space in which infringing activities happened to occur 
to active participants in the process of copyright infringement.”  See id. 
(quotation marks omitted). 
The district court improperly immunized similar conduct by the 
defendants here.  Its analysis was undermined by a number of errors that 
combined to lead to this result.  These included the district court (1) adopting 
the controversial “volitional conduct” test for direct infringement; 
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(2) misapplying that test to rule that, as a matter of law, defendants cannot 
be liable for direct infringement when they “program their servers 
to . . . download infringing content,” Giganews, 2013 WL 2109963, at *2, *9; 
and (3) extending this categorical automation ruling to defendants’ 
infringement of the distribution right, Giganews, 2013 WL 3610706, at *3. 
A. This Court Should Reject a “Volitional Conduct” Test for 
Direct Infringement  
Traditionally, “[t]o establish infringement, two elements must be 
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.”  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).  Beginning with the widely cited 1995 
Netcom case, courts have recognized that, as with any tort, direct 
infringement requires some proof of causation.  See 907 F. Supp. at 1370.  
This Court has recently characterized this as “a requirement that the 
defendant cause the copying.”  Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 
F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 Netcom observed that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute, 
there should still be some element of volition or causation.”  907 F. Supp. at 
1370 (emphasis added).  Some courts, focusing on this language but ignoring 
the use of the disjunctive, have departed from accepted copyright law to 
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create a new, additional requirement for direct infringement: an ill-defined 
concept bearing the label “volitional conduct.”3  These courts are most 
notably panels of the Fourth Circuit, which in CoStar Group, Inc. v. 
LoopNet, Inc., stated that “a person ha[s] to engage in volitional conduct . . . 
to become a direct infringer,” 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004), and the 
Second Circuit, which in Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc, 
stated that “volitional conduct is an important element of direct liability,” 536 
F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Cablevision”). 
Such a requirement, however, finds no support in copyright law and 
draws distinctions that are at once arbitrary and open to confusion and 
mistake.  It is no surprise, therefore, that courts and leading commentators 
alike have criticized or questioned these rulings and sought to limit them to 
their facts. 
For example, the next time the Fourth Circuit considered a 
defendant’s assertion that volitional conduct is a required element of direct 
infringement, the court rejected that contention and ruled against the 
                                                            
3 “That single reference to ‘volition’ has caused tremendous ferment.”  4 
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (“Nimmer”) 
§ 13.08[C] (2015). 
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defendant.  See Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 338 
F. App’x 329 (4th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).  In Quantum Systems, the 
Fourth Circuit emphasized that the CoStar Group volitional conduct ruling 
had been limited to the context of Internet service providers “passively 
storing material at the direction of users in order to make that material 
available to other users upon their request.”  Id. at 336 (quotation marks 
omitted).  The court even chided the defendant for “overstat[ing] the 
‘volitional’ requirement purportedly established by CoStar.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Other courts, including two district courts in the Ninth Circuit, have 
expressed similar skepticism.  See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. WTV 
Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“‘[I]n light of the 
fact that copyright infringement is a strict liability offense, the Court is not 
inclined to adopt’ . . . the so-called volitional conduct requirement without 
clear instruction from the Ninth Circuit.”) (quoting Arista Records LLC v. 
Myxer Inc., 2011 WL 11660773, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011)).  For its part, 
the First Circuit in 2012 observed that the “‘volitional act’ position” had been 
raised in other circuits with only “varying degrees of success,” and elected to 
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refrain from recognizing such a requirement.  Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration 
Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). 
Leading copyright scholars also have questioned or disputed the 
existence of a volitional conduct requirement.  The Nimmer treatise, for 
instance, notes its “respectful[] [disagreement]” with the Second Circuit’s 
“treatment of volitional conduct,” 4 Nimmer, supra p. 17, § 13.08[C], and 
Professor Paul Goldstein emphasizes that “American copyright law has 
never required that liability for direct infringement be imposed only on the 
individual who presses the ‘record’ button,” 2 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on 
Copyright (“Goldstein”) § 7.0.2, at 7:8.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2014).  
And the Second Circuit itself in Cablevision imposed significant 
limitations on its “volitional conduct” ruling, including that “[w]e need not 
decide today whether one’s contribution to the creation of an infringing copy 
may be so great that it warrants holding that party directly liable for the 
infringement, even though another party” has acted “volitionally” to make 
the copy.  Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131, 133.4 
                                                            
4 The “volitional conduct” test is also hopelessly ill defined: The district court 
here applied the test to find no direct infringement, reasoning that the 
defendants had not “actively caused the infringement.”  2014 WL 8628034, at 
*8 (emphasis in original).  Yet the Arista II court, following Cablevision as 
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Finally, last year, when the Supreme Court was expressly asked to 
recognize a “volitional conduct” requirement in the context of the 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(4) public performance right, it declined to do so.  In Aereo, the Court 
held that the defendant was directly liable for causing infringement of 
plaintiffs’ public performance right by providing equipment and software 
that retransmitted broadcast television signals over the Internet to the 
defendants’ subscribers.  See 134 S. Ct. at 2507.  The dissent urged the 
adoption of a “volitional conduct” requirement and – following the reasoning 
of Cablevision – a holding that the defendant was not liable for direct 
infringement because its transmissions were sent by an automated system in 
response to users’ volitional requests.  See id. at 2512-14, 2516 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).5  But the Court rejected both requests.  It held that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Second Circuit precedent, applied the test to find the defendants there liable 
for direct infringement based on substantially similar conduct, reasoning 
that they “actively engaged in the process” of copyright infringement.  633 F. 
Supp. 2d at 149. 
5   The dissent identified this Court’s decision in Fox Broadcasting as 
adopting a volitional conduct requirement, id. at 2512, but we respectfully 
submit that the dissent was mistaken.  This Court in Fox Broadcasting 
emphasized that its review of a district court preliminary injunction ruling 
was for abuse of discretion only, 747 F.3d at 1067, and the opinion did not 
even mention the terms “volitional conduct” or “volition.”  The Nimmer 
treatise thus concluded that Fox Broadcasting made no “circuit court 
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defendant was directly liable for publicly performing the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works and explained that evidence that the defendant’s system 
transmitted requested programs “[o]nly . . . in automatic response to the 
subscriber’s request” was “not critical” when establishing liability for direct 
infringement.  Id. at 2507 (majority opinion); see also 4 Nimmer, supra, 
§ 13.08 (explaining that Aereo “calls into question the discussion of volition in 
other past cases exonerating suppliers of equipment and services based on 
absence of volition”). 
This Court should likewise decline to adopt an unnecessary and 
problematic “volitional conduct” requirement for direct infringement. 
B. Automation Does Not Negate a Defendant’s Direct 
Infringement 
The district court also erred by holding that, because the defendants 
here had automated much of their conduct, they could not be liable for direct 
infringement.  See Giganews, 2014 WL 8628034, at *1, *9, & n.15; Giganews, 
2013 WL 2109963, at *5-9.  In doing so, the district court rejected key 
evidence of the defendants’ direct copyright infringement.  This included 
evidence that defendants had targeted for copying and distribution 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
pronouncement mandating the element of volition.”  4 Nimmer, supra, 
§ 13.08.   
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newsgroups and servers known to feature pirated content, programming 
their servers to copy such content and store it long enough to make 
defendants’ service a preferred destination for users looking for pirated 
music, movies, software, and images.  See Dkt. No. 508-2, Ex. 16 at 1 
(newsgroup titles including “alt.binaries.music.beatles,” 
“alt.binaries.music.springsteen,” and “alt.binaries.playboy”). 
That such conduct – deliberately designed and instigated by the 
defendants – arguably results in “a completely automated process” for 
infringement, 2014 WL 8628034, at *9 n.15, is no reason to shield defendants 
from liability for direct infringement.  
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Aereo specifically rejected 
the contention that a defendant was excused from liability for direct 
infringement of the public performance right because its transmission of 
television programs to subscribers was automated.  See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 
2507.  Many other courts in many other contexts have also made clear that 
defendants can be directly liable for copyright infringement when they use 
software to implement their decisions to infringe copyrighted content.  For 
instance, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., this Court held that the 
plaintiff had made a prima facie case that the defendant had directly 
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infringed the display right where the defendant’s “computers . . . initiate[d] 
and control[led] the storage and communication” of the plaintiff’s images.  
508 F.3d 1146, 1160 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  Similarly, in 
Arista II, the district court held that the defendants’ direct infringement of 
the distribution right included using automation to implement decisions 
regarding “which newsgroups their servers accept and store and which they 
reject.”  633 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49. 
Likewise, in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), the court held that the defendant was directly liable for 
infringement of the reproduction right where it had used a software program 
to locate and upload copyrighted iTunes songs on customers’ computers.  The 
court explained that “[w]hile that process is itself automated, absolving 
[defendant] of direct liability on that ground alone would be a distinction 
without a difference.”  Id. at 645-46, 657; see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 549, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (finding direct 
infringement of the reproduction right where the defendants’ “steps included 
using . . . software to troll the Usenet” for plaintiff’s content); Quantum Sys., 
338 F. App’x at 336 (“The fact that Sprint’s computers generated copies and 
loaded these copies into RAM automatically does not absolve Sprint of 
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liability for copyright infringement.”); 2 Goldstein, supra, p. 18, § 7.0.2 
(“[T]he economic injury to the copyright owner is the same, whether inflicted 
by man or machine; the fact that an algorithm was the culprit offers neither 
solace to the copyright owner nor incentives to the continued creation of 
literary and artistic works.”). 
This Court should clarify that automation is not a defense to direct 
copyright infringement. 
C. A “Volition” Test Could Not Logically Be Applied to 
Infringement of the Distribution Right 
The district court also erred in its rejection of the plaintiff’s 
distribution claim, on the ground that the defendants’ distribution of the 
plaintiff’s images to customers “does not state a claim because this 
distribution happens automatically, so Giganews has not engaged in 
volitional conduct by which it ‘causes’ the distribution.”  Giganews, 2013 WL 
3610706, at *3.  In addition to the reasons stated above, this ruling was 
erroneous because a “volitional conduct” standard cannot be squared with 
the law of direct infringement of the distribution right.6 
                                                            
6 In Cablevision, the Second Circuit limited its volitional conduct holding to 
the 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) reproduction right, and noted that the test might not 
apply to infringement of different Section 106 rights.  See 536 F.3d at 134. 
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17 U.S.C. § 106(3) grants owners of a copyrighted work the exclusive 
right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”  
Distribution to the public is quintessentially an act in which a defendant’s 
conduct cannot appropriately be distinguished on the basis of whether it is 
“volitional,” and a defendant’s liability cannot depend on whether a third 
party engages in a “volitional act” later in the distribution process. 
This is so for at least two reasons.  First, the text and legislative 
history of the distribution right in the Copyright Act make clear that a 
defendant engages in distribution of a work when it “makes available” the 
work for sale or other transfer, even if a copy of the work is never delivered.  
See, e.g., Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013); 17 
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(C) (expressly incorporating “making . . . available” 
standard); 4 Nimmer, supra p. 17, § 8:11[B][4][d] (collecting authority; “No 
consummated act of actual distribution need be demonstrated in order to 
implicate the copyright owner’s distribution right.”).  For example, when a 
bookseller has displayed, or allowed others to display, books for sale to the 
public, the bookseller is engaging in distribution of all the books, even if some 
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of the books are never purchased.  See 4 Nimmer, supra, p. 17 
§ 8:11[B][4][d]. 
Second, even where a defendant’s delivery is consummated by a 
purchaser or borrower’s receipt of a copy after a work has been made 
available, the defendant often is not the so-called “volitional” actor who 
causes the particular transfer to take place.  Online, for instance, a delivery 
often is consummated only when a user takes the step to select a file made 
available on a defendant’s computer.  Imposing a volitional conduct 
requirement in such circumstances would be irreconcilable with the very 
nature of the distribution right, which by definition involves conduct, like 
sales or rentals to the public, see § 106(3), that necessarily often relies on the 
later acts of third parties to consummate the delivery. 
Accordingly, the notion of “volitional conduct” has no place in 
determining whether the § 106(3) distribution right has been infringed.  
III. The District Court Misstated the Test for Intentional Inducement 
of Copyright Infringement 
The district court misstated and misapplied the test for intentional 
inducement of copyright infringement, and thus rejected the plaintiff’s claim 
under the wrong legal standard and without considering any of the plaintiff’s 
evidence of defendants’ intentional inducement. 
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Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-
37, this Court has identified two different causes of action for contributory 
copyright infringement: intentional inducement and material contribution.  
See Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1171-72.  “Despite the analytical similarities 
between the inducement and material contribution theories, it is now 
established in this Circuit that inducement and material contribution are 
distinct theories of contributory liability through which defendants can be 
found liable.”  Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) 
(emphasis added), aff’d in relevant part, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013). 
A defendant is liable for intentional inducement when it (1) provides a 
device, product, or service; (2) with the object or intent of promoting its use 
to infringe copyright; and (3) the device, product, or service causes (4) acts of 
infringement by another.  Fung, 710 F.3d at 1032, 1033.  There is no fifth 
requirement that the defendant also have actual knowledge of specific 
infringing activity caused by its device, product, or service.  On the other 
hand, a defendant is liable for material contribution when (1) with knowledge 
of infringing activity, it (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another.  See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.  The district 
court in Fung emphasized that the material contribution test’s knowledge 
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requirement is “in contrast” to the inducement test’s intent requirement.  
2009 WL 6355911, at *7. 
The district court erred by failing to treat the two causes of action as 
distinct.  Instead, it held that knowledge was a required first element of both 
tests.  See Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *6-7 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa 
Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007)).  Based on this mistaken 
view, the district court never considered defendants’ liability under the four-
part inducement test, and instead denied the plaintiff’s inducement claim 
solely on the ground that “there is no evidence that Giganews had any actual 
knowledge of any specific infringing materials that it did not immediately 
block access to.”  Id. at *11 (emphasis added). 
The district court’s legal analysis is wrong.  In stating the test for 
intentional inducement of copyright infringement, the Supreme Court in 
Grokster made clear that while a defendant’s intent to encourage 
infringement generally is a required element of inducement liability, there is 
no requirement that the defendant be aware of any specific infringements 
that its product caused.  Indeed, the Court expressly rejected – as “error” – 
the view that an Internet service operator’s secondary liability must be 
premised on the defendant’s “‘specific knowledge of infringement at a time at 
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which they contributed to the infringement.’”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933-94 
(quoting MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
The case that the district court cited for a specific-knowledge 
requirement for intentional inducement liability, Visa, simply does not say 
that.  Affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court in Visa held that the 
plaintiff had failed to adequately plead contributory infringement under 
either the inducement or material contribution theory.  See Visa, 494 F.3d at 
795.  In dictum, the Court observed that the several criteria of each test were 
“non-contradictory variations on the same basic test,” but acknowledged that 
the two tests were distinct.  Id. 
Thus, the Visa Court did not state or imply that intentional inducement 
requires evidence of a defendant’s “actual knowledge of any specific 
infringing materials that it did not immediately block access to.”  Giganews, 
2014 WL 8628031, at *11.  And if there could be any doubt on this score, this 
Court dispelled it in the later-decided Fung case.  In a thorough discussion of 
the elements and legal basis of the intentional inducement cause of action, 
this Court held that, regardless of a defendant’s knowledge of specific acts of 
infringement, “if one provides a service that could be used to infringe 
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copyrights, with the manifested intent that the service actually be used in 
that manner, that person is liable for the infringement that occurs through 
the use of the service.”  Fung, 710 F.3d at 1037; see id. at 1032 (noting that in 
Grokster “there was no evidence regarding timely knowledge of specific acts 
of infringement”). 
This Court should reverse the district court’s ruling and require the 
district court to consider the plaintiff’s evidence of the defendants’ 
intentional inducement of copyright infringement. 
IV. The District Court Misapplied the Test for Contributory Copyright 
Infringement by Material Contribution 
The district court also misapplied the test for contributory 
infringement by material contribution.  Citing an inapplicable provision of 
the DMCA, the court erroneously declined to consider evidence of the 
defendants’ actual knowledge of specific infringing activity.  See Giganews, 
2014 WL 8628031, at *8-9.   
This Court has held that a plaintiff suing a provider of Internet 
services may establish the provider’s culpable knowledge under the first 
element of the material contribution test as follows:  “‘[I]f a computer system 
operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and 
fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and 
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contributes to direct infringement.’”  Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1171 (quoting 
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-13, 1019-22). 
The plaintiff presented just such information to the defendants here, 
providing voluminous notices that detailed thousands of examples of 
infringements of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works on newsgroups made 
available on defendants’ servers.  See Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *9.  
However, the district court categorically refused to consider this evidence.  
The court held that the plaintiff’s notices failed to substantially comply with 
all the requirements of the DMCA 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) safe harbor and 
therefore could “‘not be considered . . . in determining whether a service 
provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.’”  Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *8 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i)).7 
This ruling was erroneous because the cited statutory provision by its 
terms applies only to a defendant’s eligibility for a DMCA safe harbor.  See 
                                                            
7 The district court held that the plaintiff’s notices were provided in a way 
that made it purportedly cumbersome for the defendants to use the notices 
to remove infringing files, see Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *8-9, and thus, 
in the court’s view, failed to comply with the requirement that DMCA notices 
provide “‘information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material.’”  Id. at *8 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii)). 
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17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i)) (providing that non-compliant notices “shall not 
be considered under paragraph (1)(A),” the DMCA safe harbor for 
information storage services) (emphasis added).  The defendants here, 
however, did not move for summary judgment on any DMCA safe harbor 
defense. 
As this Court has emphasized, the DMCA merely provides an 
affirmative defense to a qualifying Internet service provider.  “[T]he DMCA 
does not change copyright law,” Amazon.com, 508 F.3d at 1158 n.4, and 
“[f]ar short of adopting enhanced or wholly new standards to evaluate claims 
of copyright infringement against online service providers, Congress 
provided that [the DMCA’s] ‘limitations of liability apply if the provider is 
found to be liable under existing principles of law.’”  Ellison v. Robertson, 
357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). 
The DMCA safe harbor provisions therefore cannot be applied here to 
limit the “existing principle[]” of contributory infringement law: information 
in any form that provides a defendant with actual knowledge of specific 
infringing activity must be considered by a court.8  Accordingly, this Court 
                                                            
8 As support, the district court cited Luvdarts, LLC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 
710 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2013); see Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at 
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should reverse the district court’s ruling and instruct the district court to 
evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence of the defendants’ actual knowledge of 
infringing activity on their service. 
V. The District Court Misconstrued the Financial-Benefit Element of 
the Test for Vicarious Copyright Infringement 
A defendant infringes vicariously by (1) failing to exercise a right or 
ability to stop or limit the direct copyright infringement of others, while 
(2) enjoying a financial benefit from the infringing activity.  See Grokster, 545 
U.S. at 930; Visa, 494 F.3d at 788. 
It is well established that the financial benefit element is satisfied by 
showing that “the availability of infringing material ‘acts as a “draw” for 
customers,’” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
*8.  But in Luvdarts this Court merely observed that the plaintiff’s 
infringement notices would not have satisfied the DMCA.  Luvdarts’ holding 
was that the plaintiff’s notices failed to create evidence of defendants’ 
knowledge of specific infringing activity, not because the notices were DMCA 
non-compliant but because they merely listed titles of copyrighted works 
that the plaintiffs owned, failing to “identify which of these titles were 
infringed, who infringed them, or when the infringement occurred.”  710 F.3d 
at 1073.  Such notices failed to establish culpable knowledge because they 
were “indistinguishable from a generalized notification that infringement is 
occurring.”  Id. at 1072-73.  The district court here did not make such a 
finding about the notices in this case. 
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Cir. 2001) (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-
64 (9th Cir. 1996)), “regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion 
to a defendant’s overall profits,” Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis 
omitted). 
Here, the plaintiff presented evidence that defendants’ business is 
devoted to promoting and benefiting from massive copyright infringement; 
their service is “awash in copyrighted material,” including, “staggering 
amounts of copyrighted works owned by move producers and television 
networks,” Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *4; and they charge users as 
much as $34.99 a month for no reason other than the ability to acquire 
unauthorized access to this copyrighted material.  That evidence should have 
readily satisfied the financial benefit element. 
The district court rejected this evidence.  Citing no legal authority, the 
court held that the plaintiff also had to show “that at least some of Giganews’ 
customers were ‘drawn’ to Giganews’ services, in part, to obtain access to 
infringing Perfect 10 material” or at least “the broader category of erotic 
images.”  Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *4 (emphasis in original).9 
                                                            
9 Having granted summary judgment on the financial benefit element, the 
district court declined to address the supervision or control element.  See 
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The district court’s addition of an extra element to the financial benefit 
test is contrary to law and policy.  For decades, courts have consistently 
premised vicarious liability on a defendant being in the best position to stop 
or limit copyright infringement generally based on their right or ability to 
supervise or control it, and having the duty to do so because of the financial 
benefit they received from infringement.  See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1963) (defendant 
department store operator had the ability to supervise “the conduct of its 
[bootleg record] concessionaire . . . ; our judgment will simply encourage it to 
do so, thus placing responsibility where it can and should be effectively 
exercised”). 
In fact, there has never been an additional requirement that the 
financial benefit from infringement be parsed on a work-by-work or plaintiff-
by-plaintiff basis.  That is not the purpose of vicariously liability.  Rather, 
[w]hen an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in 
which identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is 
ordinarily fair and reasonable to place responsibility for 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Giganews, 2014 WL 8628031, at *6.  Since the defendants had pervasive 
control over their own servers, chose what content to copy, and could grant 
or deny server access, see Giganews, 2014 WL 8628034, at *3, the plaintiff 
easily would have satisfied this element. 
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those losses on the person who profits . . . .   The enterprise 
and the person profiting from it are better able than either 
the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose act 
caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to 
others who have profited from the enterprise. 
Polygram Int’l Publ’g., Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (D. 
Mass. 1994).   
 Thus, in Polygram, the court noted that in the earliest vicarious 
infringement cases, “courts determined that profit could be inferred from the 
very fact of playing music in a profit-making establishment.”  Id. at 1330 
(emphasis omitted).  The court found that a defendant computer trade show 
had benefited financially because music enhanced the attractiveness of the 
show and some of the defendant’s exhibitors “performed music, some of it 
copyrighted, to attract attention to their booths.”  Id. at 1333.  The 
requirement for liability was only that music in general was the draw, not the 
specific copyrighted works of any of the fifteen separate plaintiffs in the case.   
Likewise, this Court and courts within the Ninth Circuit have 
determined that a defendant’s draw from infringement generally is sufficient 
to establish liability, without requiring a draw particularized to the works of 
individual plaintiffs or a specific category of works.  For instance, in Napster, 
this Court affirmed a finding of likely vicarious infringement based on the 
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benefit accruing to Napster “as the quality and quantity of available music 
increases.”  239 F.3d at 1023 (emphasis added; quotation omitted).  This 
Court thus affirmed an injunction in favor of a group of plaintiffs that 
included individual songwriters without any determination that those 
individuals’ compositions had themselves been a draw.  Similarly, in Ellison, 
where an individual author sued AOL for infringement of his books, this 
Court did not limit its consideration to the draw to AOL from the plaintiff’s 
books, or even books as a category, but instead examined the draw for AOL 
from “the infringing activity taking place on [AOL’s] USENET servers.”  
Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079.  See also, e.g., Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263-64 
(considering the draw of “the sale of pirated recordings” rather than the 
draw of infringements of plaintiff’s own recordings).  
As one court put it, “Defendants cannot deny that they expected 
financial benefit from the entertainment made available at their 
establishment.  Defendants cannot avoid responsibility by requiring a 
specific showing of profits derived from the performances at issue.”  BMI v. 
Blumonday, Inc., 1994 WL 259253, at *2 (D. Nev. May 27, 1994). 
The district court’s ruling here also flies in the face of the policy behind 
vicarious liability.  Under the district court’s rationale, a defendant that 
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profits from massive copyright infringement and could act to stop or limit the 
infringement would have the duty to do so as to only some of the victims of 
its infringing business.  In particular, smaller copyright owners could be left 
without an effective remedy based on the difficulty of showing that users who 
were paying up to $35 a month for all the unauthorized music, movies, 
software, and images they could download were drawn specifically to one 
copyright owner’s works. 
Neither law nor logic supports the district court’s financial benefit 
ruling; it should be reversed.  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s direct infringement, 
vicarious infringement, inducement of infringement, and contributory 
infringement rulings should be reversed. 
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